EVEN AFTER CITIGROUP'S HIGHLY DILUTIVE DEAL with the government on Friday, battered bank stocks managed to end the week up 11%, well above the lows set Feb. 20. One reason is that guidelines for the government's "stress test" for banks, unveiled Wednesday, proved less onerous than expected. A second reason is that capital levels at the nation's regional banks now look fairly sturdy.
The Citi deal has everyone on Wall Street suddenly talking about a measure of financial strength called tangible capital, which is a bank's tangible common equity divided by its tangible assets. Citi (ticker: C) ranks as one of the worst institutions by this measure, with a tangible-capital ratio of 1.5%. Now that Citi has announced that the government and private investors will have the opportunity to convert their preferred shares into common shares, Citi's tangible capital ratio looks likely to jump to 4%. Many analysts and investors think 4% will emerge as the government's targeted minimum.
Prior to the Citi deal, regulators had focused on Tier 1 capital, which includes preferred stock and has been criticized for overstating banks' financial strength.
John Kuczala for Barron's
Troweling on the dollars alone won't put a lasting patch on the broken banking system.
Citi's Tier 1 capital appears healthy at 11.9%, double the regulatory minimum despite the bank's major problems. Because all Tier 1 capital cannot be easily used to absorb losses, investors are looking beyond that measure to tangible common equity. Now it appears that regulators are doing the same.
As shown on the table below, the change shouldn't pose a problem for many of the nation's large regional banks, many of them with tangible-capital ratios exceeding 5%.
Among the largest banks, JPMorgan Chase (JPM) is nearly at the 4% threshold, with a tangible-capital ratio of 3.8%. JPMorgan could easily hit the 4% mark by building capital over time. It took a step in that direction last week, announcing plans to cut its dividend 87%. This should add $5 billion to Morgan's tangible capital this year, pushing it to the 4% mark.
The new emphasis on tangible capital is a thornier issue for Bank of America (BAC), with a 2.6% tangible-capital ratio, and Wells Fargo (WFC), with a 2.8% ratio. Like Citi, they could meet a 4% minimum by having the government or private investors convert some preferred shares to common. The problem is that such a conversion would leave current holders of common stock owning less of Bank of America and Wells Fargo.
Table: A Capital DebateFears of this dilution pushed Bank of America stock down 25% Friday to 3.95, while Wells shares fell 16% to 12.10.
Executives at both BofA and Wells have said they don't see the need to raise capital right now, and there may be merit to that view. They could argue that their assets have already been marked down in value more than the assets of other banks, in part because Bank of America recently acquired Merrill Lynch and Wells acquired Wachovia. Indeed, Merrill Lynch marked its assets down substantially before selling itself to Bank America, while Wells took large write-downs of Wachovia's assets while completing the acquisition.
What does all this mean for investors? For the brave and the bold, it could mean opportunity. Given many false dawns for bank stocks in the past year, it is hazardous to call a bottom. But there is a case to be made that last week's rally in bank stocks could continue. Most banks look inexpensive, based on the ratio of their stock prices to tangible book value, a conservative measure of shareholder equity that excludes goodwill from acquisitions. A sizable slice of the industry is trading below tangible book value for the first time since 1990, including Bank of America, Capital One (COF), KeyCorp (KEY), SunTrust Banks (STI) and Comerica (CMA).
No question, bank profits will be depressed this year, and perhaps into 2010, with many institutions showing losses in 2009, as banks set aside reserves for growing loan losses. Some investment pros are steering clear of the group in favor of other depressed financial outfits, including asset managers and insurers.
Dividends, once hefty throughout the banking sector, are likely to be trimmed, as even relatively strong institutions reduce payouts to bolster capital. Analysts say dividend cuts are possible at Wells Fargo, U.S. Bancorp (USB) and PNC Financial (PNC). Oddly enough, JPMorgan's dividend cut didn't hurt its stock. Investors have become less focused on dividends than financial strength, particularly tangible book value. Anything that enhances book, including a payout cut, has come to be seen as a plus.
Four banks -- Bank of America, Citigroup, JPMorgan and Wells Fargo -- now dominate the industry, with combined assets of $7 trillion. No. 5 PNC has less than a quarter of the assets of No. 4 Wells Fargo. Bernstein analyst John McDonald's favorite megabank is JPMorgan, because it has a very "attractive risk-reward" ratio. It is trading at 23, just above its tangible book of $22. McDonald thinks JPMorgan's profit in 2011, the year that many analysts have targeted for a full-fledged economic recovery, could top $4 a share. His one-year price target is $38.
Among JPMorgan's most valuable assets is Jamie Dimon, arguably the best chief executive at any big financial company. Such praise, however, might be going to Dimon's head. In announcing the dividend cut Monday, he lauded his bank's "fortress balance sheet." Yet JPMorgan is still leveraged more than 25-to-1, based on its tangible equity. At a true fortress like Warren Buffett's Berkshire Hathaway (BRK-A), the leverage is just 3-to-1.
McDonald's colleague at Bernstein, Kevin St. Pierre, favors Comerica and U.S. Bancorp among the regionals. Comerica is now headquartered in Dallas and has significant exposure to depressed Michigan, but it also has one of the industry's highest capital ratios, based on common equity. U.S. Bancorp historically has had some of the sector's highest returns and should be in the black this year, too.
Investors didn't react well to Citigroup's announcement Friday that the government would convert up to $25 billion of its current preferred-stock investment under the Troubled Asset Relief Program into Citi common shares, giving Uncle Sam a 36% stake in the beleaguered bank. That action, combined with Citi's offer Friday to exchange some $27.5 billion of private and publicly held preferred into common shares, sent Citi shares down 96 cents, or 39%, to $1.50 on enormous volume: nearly two billion shares.
Investors are worried about several issues, including dilution, corporate governance and future business mix. If all the preferred is converted into common, Citi's share count will balloon to 22 billion from about 5.5 billion, massively diluting the positions of existing common holders, who will own just 26% of Citi shares.
The bull case on Citi now is that it has dealt with its capital shortfall and that the stock is appealing, trading well below the likely new tangible book value of $3.70 a share. "Investors are asking: 'Is Citi investable?' " says Bernstein's McDonald.
One concern among investors is that more than half of Citi's prospective common equity of $81 billion will consist of a deferred tax asset of $44 billion, which would protect some future earnings from taxes. The worry is that a wounded Citi may not be able to earn enough to use that shield.
Citi's $15 billion of preferred shares rallied on the news, although they are trading way below their face value. The company's Series P preferred finished Friday at $8.05, up $2.57 on the session, but still a fraction of the face value of $25.
Citi's preferred exchange offer created considerable confusion among investors because important details weren't released Friday. Citi is offering to swap common shares for preferred stock held by the public, but the precise exchange ratio probably won't be known until this week. Citi's publicly held preferred could rally if the terms are as generous as those accepted by the government and private investors, who are converting into common at about 45 cents on the dollar. In contrast, the publicly held preferred, trading at $8, is now valued at just 33 cents on the dollar.
Preferred holders probably should convert because Citi will stop paying dividends on unconverted preferred. Citi will continue to pay dividends on some $23 billion of outstanding trust preferreds.
If Citi's public preferred holders fare worse than the government, expect investor complaints. Congressional critics of TARP, too, could be upset at the Treasury's initial 55% loss on the conversion.
Saturday, February 28, 2009
Friday, February 27, 2009
Stanford: The First Arrest is Made
It's most frustrating being on a plane at JFK and reading the complaint against Laura Pendergest-Holt, knowing that you won't be able to blog it for another eight hours or so. It's a curious thing: basically she's been arrested on obstruction of justice charges because she wasn't completely forthright when she testified in early February, at the time that the Stanford story was breaking all over the press. But she was clearly set up as the patsy: because Allen Stanford himself, along with his CFO James Davis, refused to testify at all, they can't be arrested on similar charges.
On the other hand, there was some really big stuff that Pendergest-Holt knew and didn't say to investigators, not least that $1.6 billion of Stanford International Bank's "assets" consisted of a loan to Allen Stanford himself. And that the $541 million "capital contribution" that Sir Allen made to the bank in December was made up largely of real-estate holdings which the bank already owned, having bought them for $88 million earlier in the year.
Meanwhile, the FT has dug up an NASD arbitration proceeding from 2003 in which a former Stanford employee, Leyla Basagoitia, accused Stanford of running a Ponzi scheme. The NASD -- which later became Finra -- wasn't buying it:
Ms Basagoitia's allegations were denied by Stanford Group Company and dismissed by the dispute resolution panel. She was ordered to pay Stanford $107,782 in damages, in repayment of a loan advanced to her while an employee of the company.
Michael Falick, the lawyer who acted for Ms Basagoitia, said his client contacted the SEC about the alleged fraud in tandem with her NASD complaint. Mr Falick said: "It was really troubling, because the NASD was meant to be a regulatory body."
Note that this was an NASD proceeding, not an SEC proceeding (although Basagoitia did inform the SEC as well as the NASD of her suspicions). So Blodget's off base here:
Mary Schapiro wasn't running the SEC when it muffed this latest scam, so she can blame it on her predecessor.
Not true! The vice-chairman of the NASD at the time that Basagoitia made her allegations was one Mary Schapiro. And true to the NASD's nature, the arbitration panel reflexively sided with the company rather than the employee.
And elsewhere on the Stanford-victims front, I just got an email from a Stanford employee:
Employees in all U.S. offices were told by the Receiver that "Payroll would be met and benefits were still in effect" as part of their initial communication to employees (in person) as they closed offices. Funds for payroll are reportedly in Stanford's Treasury department, employees were called in to process payroll, but the Receiver has not approved the transfer of funds to meet this payroll obligation. Funds should have been transferred into employee bank accounts at midnight tonight, and paper checks mailed tomorrow.
Stanford employees were told they were not terminated last week, that in fact "it was business as usual" per the Receiver's email to global Stanford employees. "Consider it a paid vacation," a Stanford employee was told in Memphis, Tennessee. This means employees were not able to begin the process to file for unemployment or make other arrangements with creditors that their income had been suspended.
In fact, many employees were called in to assist the Receiver in many departments. All employees have been working under the assumption that the Receiver would honor the commitment made to meet payroll. Were these employees called back under false pretenses? Funds are in-house to pay employees per Receiver's promise - Receiver now apologizes for the hardship. Why is Receiver now denying to release the monies? Arethe lawyers and other "outside experts" hired by the Receiver being paid with funds promised to meet payroll?
While criminal charges against Allen Stanford or Jim Davis have not been filed, most employees feel that a crime has been committed against them by the Receiver.
Said employees almost certainly include former Fed governor Lyle Gramley. Has anybody got around to asking him anything about his employer yet?
On the other hand, there was some really big stuff that Pendergest-Holt knew and didn't say to investigators, not least that $1.6 billion of Stanford International Bank's "assets" consisted of a loan to Allen Stanford himself. And that the $541 million "capital contribution" that Sir Allen made to the bank in December was made up largely of real-estate holdings which the bank already owned, having bought them for $88 million earlier in the year.
Meanwhile, the FT has dug up an NASD arbitration proceeding from 2003 in which a former Stanford employee, Leyla Basagoitia, accused Stanford of running a Ponzi scheme. The NASD -- which later became Finra -- wasn't buying it:
Ms Basagoitia's allegations were denied by Stanford Group Company and dismissed by the dispute resolution panel. She was ordered to pay Stanford $107,782 in damages, in repayment of a loan advanced to her while an employee of the company.
Michael Falick, the lawyer who acted for Ms Basagoitia, said his client contacted the SEC about the alleged fraud in tandem with her NASD complaint. Mr Falick said: "It was really troubling, because the NASD was meant to be a regulatory body."
Note that this was an NASD proceeding, not an SEC proceeding (although Basagoitia did inform the SEC as well as the NASD of her suspicions). So Blodget's off base here:
Mary Schapiro wasn't running the SEC when it muffed this latest scam, so she can blame it on her predecessor.
Not true! The vice-chairman of the NASD at the time that Basagoitia made her allegations was one Mary Schapiro. And true to the NASD's nature, the arbitration panel reflexively sided with the company rather than the employee.
And elsewhere on the Stanford-victims front, I just got an email from a Stanford employee:
Employees in all U.S. offices were told by the Receiver that "Payroll would be met and benefits were still in effect" as part of their initial communication to employees (in person) as they closed offices. Funds for payroll are reportedly in Stanford's Treasury department, employees were called in to process payroll, but the Receiver has not approved the transfer of funds to meet this payroll obligation. Funds should have been transferred into employee bank accounts at midnight tonight, and paper checks mailed tomorrow.
Stanford employees were told they were not terminated last week, that in fact "it was business as usual" per the Receiver's email to global Stanford employees. "Consider it a paid vacation," a Stanford employee was told in Memphis, Tennessee. This means employees were not able to begin the process to file for unemployment or make other arrangements with creditors that their income had been suspended.
In fact, many employees were called in to assist the Receiver in many departments. All employees have been working under the assumption that the Receiver would honor the commitment made to meet payroll. Were these employees called back under false pretenses? Funds are in-house to pay employees per Receiver's promise - Receiver now apologizes for the hardship. Why is Receiver now denying to release the monies? Arethe lawyers and other "outside experts" hired by the Receiver being paid with funds promised to meet payroll?
While criminal charges against Allen Stanford or Jim Davis have not been filed, most employees feel that a crime has been committed against them by the Receiver.
Said employees almost certainly include former Fed governor Lyle Gramley. Has anybody got around to asking him anything about his employer yet?
Thursday, February 26, 2009
Jeremy Grantham Invests Cautiously These Days
Meanwhile, GMO chairman Jeremy Grantham is more upbeat — though he does expect more pain to precede any recovery.
Looking back at historic bear markets, Grantham draws comparisons to 1974 and 1982, when the S&P 500 lost roughly half its value. Since he estimates the current S&P 500 fair value at 900, Grantham puts his worst-case bottom at a hair-raising 450.
“That’s fairly scary, but on the one hand we look at the massive stimulus, and then on the other we try to work out the fact that the global economy is in worse shape than it was in ‘74 or ‘82,” says Grantham. “I’d say there are three-to-one odds that we go to a material new low. We should count on [the S&P 500] hitting 600 for a little while, and we should hope like mad it doesn’t get deep into the 500s.”
Patience rules. Another looming threat is that the market may enter an extended period of drops and rebounds that flatten long-term returns and strand buy-and-hold investors for decades.
Japan’s stalled stock market is one recent example, but the U.S. has had its shares of quagmires, too. Grantham likes to point out that investors who bought at market crests in 1929 and 1965 had to wait 19 years each time just to break even.
Still, Grantham says buy-and-hold still makes sense for long-term investors when stocks are trading below fair value. He especially favors U.S. blue chips, and his fund is on a strict, slow schedule to invest as valuations dip even lower.
“If you don’t have a schedule for investing, you will not do it,” he says. “When the market goes down, it reinforces the hoarding of cash. By the bottom, you suffer what we called in 1974 terminal paralysis — you cannot pull the trigger. Almost everyone who avoids the great pain is very slow to get back.”
Looking back at historic bear markets, Grantham draws comparisons to 1974 and 1982, when the S&P 500 lost roughly half its value. Since he estimates the current S&P 500 fair value at 900, Grantham puts his worst-case bottom at a hair-raising 450.
“That’s fairly scary, but on the one hand we look at the massive stimulus, and then on the other we try to work out the fact that the global economy is in worse shape than it was in ‘74 or ‘82,” says Grantham. “I’d say there are three-to-one odds that we go to a material new low. We should count on [the S&P 500] hitting 600 for a little while, and we should hope like mad it doesn’t get deep into the 500s.”
Patience rules. Another looming threat is that the market may enter an extended period of drops and rebounds that flatten long-term returns and strand buy-and-hold investors for decades.
Japan’s stalled stock market is one recent example, but the U.S. has had its shares of quagmires, too. Grantham likes to point out that investors who bought at market crests in 1929 and 1965 had to wait 19 years each time just to break even.
Still, Grantham says buy-and-hold still makes sense for long-term investors when stocks are trading below fair value. He especially favors U.S. blue chips, and his fund is on a strict, slow schedule to invest as valuations dip even lower.
“If you don’t have a schedule for investing, you will not do it,” he says. “When the market goes down, it reinforces the hoarding of cash. By the bottom, you suffer what we called in 1974 terminal paralysis — you cannot pull the trigger. Almost everyone who avoids the great pain is very slow to get back.”
Wednesday, February 25, 2009
Major phases of a bear market
Historically, major bear markets have also followed distinct patterns.
1. First phase
There is a sharp initial fall that removes much of the 'froth' from the market.
2. Middle phase
There is a strong rally in prices for several months, which may lull some investors into thinking that the bear market is over. The rallies can be dramatic, but have lower trading volume than the initial sell-offs. And the advances tend to be concentrated on a few selected stocks, not the whole market.
3. Third phase
There is a long slow downward grind in prices, accompanied by low volume and periodic false dawns until the bear phase ends quietly as share valuations reach rock bottom. At this point, few investors from the earlier buoyant phase in the market are interested in anything other than the most conservative investments.
1. First phase
There is a sharp initial fall that removes much of the 'froth' from the market.
2. Middle phase
There is a strong rally in prices for several months, which may lull some investors into thinking that the bear market is over. The rallies can be dramatic, but have lower trading volume than the initial sell-offs. And the advances tend to be concentrated on a few selected stocks, not the whole market.
3. Third phase
There is a long slow downward grind in prices, accompanied by low volume and periodic false dawns until the bear phase ends quietly as share valuations reach rock bottom. At this point, few investors from the earlier buoyant phase in the market are interested in anything other than the most conservative investments.
Tuesday, February 24, 2009
Worst on Records
Economists were expecting today's report on Consumer Confidence for February to come in at 35, which would have been the lowest level on record. The actual number, however, came in much lower at a level of 25. Not only is this the lowest reading on record, but it is also the fifth worst report versus expectations since at least 1999. In the chart below, we highlight the monthly readings of the Consumer Confidence report going back to 1967 (recessions highlighted in gray).
Friday, February 20, 2009
Paul Krugman
Nobel Laureate Paul Krugman made a stop at Wharton this week to give his assessment of the economy and the stimulus. He gave his standard message: Government spending is the only way out, but the current stimulus is too small.
What caught our eye was his prediction for how the economy would eventually recover:
Eventually, even with inadequate policy measures, there will likely be a spontaneous recovery. Goods "wear out, rust away," and people will someday want to buy new technologies that will be clearly superior to what they have now. "Look at auto sales," Krugman said. "At current buying rates it would take 23.9 years to replace the current stock." Obviously it's not going to take that long, he added. Buying rates will eventually pick up.
So wait, the economy will recover when our capital stock wears out and rusts away? This sounds suspiciously like our old friend the "broken-window fallacy" the silly idea that a broken store window is good for the economy because the shopkeeper has to replace it, helping everyone in the window and glass industries.
Nobody seriously believes that's true, though you sometimes hear that logic trotted out when there's a hurricane or tornado, and someone talks about all the jobs the rebuilding will create.
Under Krugman's logic, perhaps we should sabotage our equipment so that the wearing-out could happen a little faster, bringing about our recovery.
What caught our eye was his prediction for how the economy would eventually recover:
Eventually, even with inadequate policy measures, there will likely be a spontaneous recovery. Goods "wear out, rust away," and people will someday want to buy new technologies that will be clearly superior to what they have now. "Look at auto sales," Krugman said. "At current buying rates it would take 23.9 years to replace the current stock." Obviously it's not going to take that long, he added. Buying rates will eventually pick up.
So wait, the economy will recover when our capital stock wears out and rusts away? This sounds suspiciously like our old friend the "broken-window fallacy" the silly idea that a broken store window is good for the economy because the shopkeeper has to replace it, helping everyone in the window and glass industries.
Nobody seriously believes that's true, though you sometimes hear that logic trotted out when there's a hurricane or tornado, and someone talks about all the jobs the rebuilding will create.
Under Krugman's logic, perhaps we should sabotage our equipment so that the wearing-out could happen a little faster, bringing about our recovery.
Tuesday, February 17, 2009
Friday, February 13, 2009
Stimulus Package Explained
If you spend that money at Wal-Mart, all the money will go to China.
If you spend it on gasoline it will go to Hugo Chavez, the Arabs and Al Queda
If you purchase a computer it will go to Taiwan.
If you purchase fruit and vegetables it will go to Mexico, Honduras, and Guatemala (unless you buy organic).
If you buy a car it will go to Japan and Korea.
If you purchase prescription drugs it will go to India
If you purchase heroin it will go to the Taliban in Afghanistan
If you give it to a charitable cause, it will go to Nigeria
If you spend it on gasoline it will go to Hugo Chavez, the Arabs and Al Queda
If you purchase a computer it will go to Taiwan.
If you purchase fruit and vegetables it will go to Mexico, Honduras, and Guatemala (unless you buy organic).
If you buy a car it will go to Japan and Korea.
If you purchase prescription drugs it will go to India
If you purchase heroin it will go to the Taliban in Afghanistan
If you give it to a charitable cause, it will go to Nigeria
Tuesday, February 10, 2009
Marc Faber Sees High Inflation, Banana Republic In Store For U.S.
The US risks being hit by Zimbabwe-style hyperinflation and there are signs that the world’s biggest economy risks turning into a banana republic, Marc Faber, author of the Gloom, Doom & Boom report, told CNBC’s “Asia Squawk Box.”
“In the US, we have a totally new school, and it’s called the Zimbabwe school,” Faber said. “And it’s founded by one of the great leaders of this world, Mr Robert Mugabe, that has managed to totally impoverish his own country. And that is the monetary policy the US is pursuing.”
The government’s increased intervention in the economy is likely to slow down economic growth because history shows that every time the private sector shrinks to make way for the government sector, the economy suffers, he said.
Asked whether the US risked being faced with 200 percent inflation, Faber answered: “Well, not yet. Not yet. But I think eventually. If I look at government debt in the US, and debt in general, I think the only way they will not default physically on their debt is to inflate.”
Dr. Faber, who is often called “Dr. Doom” by the media, believes that the United States is on the path to becoming a “banana republic.” From the CNBC piece:
The Federal Reserve’s policy of printing money and the government’s intervention in the economy might undermine the US’s economic and political clout, Faber warned.
“Well, I wrote two years ago a report entitled ‘Is America becoming a banana republic?’ And there are some features that characterize banana republics-totalitarian states, very strong government intervention into the economy, and the polarization of wealth,” he said.
“And we have all these trends occurring in the US. We are not yet there. And in theory it could be reversed, but I doubt it will be,” Faber added.
“In the US, we have a totally new school, and it’s called the Zimbabwe school,” Faber said. “And it’s founded by one of the great leaders of this world, Mr Robert Mugabe, that has managed to totally impoverish his own country. And that is the monetary policy the US is pursuing.”
The government’s increased intervention in the economy is likely to slow down economic growth because history shows that every time the private sector shrinks to make way for the government sector, the economy suffers, he said.
Asked whether the US risked being faced with 200 percent inflation, Faber answered: “Well, not yet. Not yet. But I think eventually. If I look at government debt in the US, and debt in general, I think the only way they will not default physically on their debt is to inflate.”
Dr. Faber, who is often called “Dr. Doom” by the media, believes that the United States is on the path to becoming a “banana republic.” From the CNBC piece:
The Federal Reserve’s policy of printing money and the government’s intervention in the economy might undermine the US’s economic and political clout, Faber warned.
“Well, I wrote two years ago a report entitled ‘Is America becoming a banana republic?’ And there are some features that characterize banana republics-totalitarian states, very strong government intervention into the economy, and the polarization of wealth,” he said.
“And we have all these trends occurring in the US. We are not yet there. And in theory it could be reversed, but I doubt it will be,” Faber added.
Monday, February 9, 2009
Recover may come sooner than you want
Paul Kasriel, the great Northern Trust economist who saw much of this mess coming, uses history to explain why recovery may now come sooner than most people think.
Specifically, Paul debunks the idea that the Great Depression was a decade-long disaster: It was actually two recessions--one long bad one, and one short shallow one--separated by a robust four-year recovery. He also points out the numerous, huge mistakes made by policy-makers and observes that we aren't likely to make any of them again.
Paul concludes:
I believe that large increases in federal government spending that are monetized by the Fed and the banking system will result in a recovery in real economic activity. When that recovery sets in depends on how quickly the federal government increases its spending and by the magnitude of that increase. We can debate whether tax rates should be cut or federal spending should be increased. We can debate what kinds of spending should be increased. We can debate whether the federal government should increase any of its spending. But the facts of the 1930s appear to be pretty clear – monetized increased federal government spending does result in increased real economic activity in the short run.
The economic data are likely to be abysmal through the first half of this year. The popular
media will reinforce the gloom of the data. The same pundits who did not see this downturn
coming will not see the recovery coming either. My advice to you is to keep your eye on the
index of Leading Economic Indicators. If history is any guide, the LEI will signal a recovery
well ahead of the pundits.
Specifically, Paul debunks the idea that the Great Depression was a decade-long disaster: It was actually two recessions--one long bad one, and one short shallow one--separated by a robust four-year recovery. He also points out the numerous, huge mistakes made by policy-makers and observes that we aren't likely to make any of them again.
Paul concludes:
I believe that large increases in federal government spending that are monetized by the Fed and the banking system will result in a recovery in real economic activity. When that recovery sets in depends on how quickly the federal government increases its spending and by the magnitude of that increase. We can debate whether tax rates should be cut or federal spending should be increased. We can debate what kinds of spending should be increased. We can debate whether the federal government should increase any of its spending. But the facts of the 1930s appear to be pretty clear – monetized increased federal government spending does result in increased real economic activity in the short run.
The economic data are likely to be abysmal through the first half of this year. The popular
media will reinforce the gloom of the data. The same pundits who did not see this downturn
coming will not see the recovery coming either. My advice to you is to keep your eye on the
index of Leading Economic Indicators. If history is any guide, the LEI will signal a recovery
well ahead of the pundits.
Sunday, February 8, 2009
Recession? No, It's a D-process, and It Will Be Long
NOBODY WAS BETTER PREPARED FOR THE GLOBAL market crash than clients of Ray Dalio's Bridgewater Associates and subscribers to its Daily Observations. Dalio, the chief investment officer and all-around guiding light of the global money-management company he founded more than 30 years ago, began sounding alarms in Barron's in the spring of 2007 about the dangers of excessive financial leverage. He counts among his clients world governments and central banks, as well as pension funds and endowments.
Matthew Furman for Barron's
"The regulators have to decide how banks will operate. That means they are going to have to nationalize some in some form." -- Ray Dalio
No wonder. The Westport, Conn.-based firm, whose analyses of world markets focus on credit and currencies, has produced long-term annual returns, net of fees, averaging 15%. In the turmoil of 2008, Bridgewater's Pure Alpha 1 fund gained 8.7% net of fees and Pure Alpha 2 delivered 9.4%.
Here's what's on his mind now.
Barron's: I can't think of anyone who was earlier in describing the deleveraging and deflationary process that has been happening around the world.
Dalio: Let's call it a "D-process," which is different than a recession, and the only reason that people really don't understand this process is because it happens rarely. Everybody should, at this point, try to understand the depression process by reading about the Great Depression or the Latin American debt crisis or the Japanese experience so that it becomes part of their frame of reference. Most people didn't live through any of those experiences, and what they have gotten used to is the recession dynamic, and so they are quick to presume the recession dynamic. It is very clear to me that we are in a D-process.
Why are you hesitant to emphasize either the words depression or deflation? Why call it a D-process?
Both of those words have connotations associated with them that can confuse the fact that it is a process that people should try to understand.
You can describe a recession as an economic retraction which occurs when the Federal Reserve tightens monetary policy normally to fight inflation. The cycle continues until the economy weakens enough to bring down the inflation rate, at which time the Federal Reserve eases monetary policy and produces an expansion. We can make it more complicated, but that is a basic simple description of what recessions are and what we have experienced through the post-World War II period. What you also need is a comparable understanding of what a D-process is and why it is different.
You have made the point that only by understanding the process can you combat the problem. Are you confident that we are doing what's essential to combat deflation and a depression?
The D-process is a disease of sorts that is going to run its course.
When I first started seeing the D-process and describing it, it was before it actually started to play out this way. But now you can ask yourself, OK, when was the last time bank stocks went down so much? When was the last time the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve, or any central bank, exploded like it has? When was the last time interest rates went to zero, essentially, making monetary policy as we know it ineffective? When was the last time we had deflation?
The answers to those questions all point to times other than the U.S. post-World War II experience. This was the dynamic that occurred in Japan in the '90s, that occurred in Latin America in the '80s, and that occurred in the Great Depression in the '30s.
Basically what happens is that after a period of time, economies go through a long-term debt cycle -- a dynamic that is self-reinforcing, in which people finance their spending by borrowing and debts rise relative to incomes and, more accurately, debt-service payments rise relative to incomes. At cycle peaks, assets are bought on leverage at high-enough prices that the cash flows they produce aren't adequate to service the debt. The incomes aren't adequate to service the debt. Then begins the reversal process, and that becomes self-reinforcing, too. In the simplest sense, the country reaches the point when it needs a debt restructuring. General Motors is a metaphor for the United States.
As goes GM, so goes the nation?
The process of bankruptcy or restructuring is necessary to its viability. One way or another, General Motors has to be restructured so that it is a self-sustaining, economically viable entity that people want to lend to again.
This has happened in Latin America regularly. Emerging countries default, and then restructure. It is an essential process to get them economically healthy.
We will go through a giant debt-restructuring, because we either have to bring debt-service payments down so they are low relative to incomes -- the cash flows that are being produced to service them -- or we are going to have to raise incomes by printing a lot of money.
It isn't complicated. It is the same as all bankruptcies, but when it happens pervasively to a country, and the country has a lot of foreign debt denominated in its own currency, it is preferable to print money and devalue.
Isn't the process of restructuring under way in households and at corporations?
They are cutting costs to service the debt. But they haven't yet done much restructuring. Last year, 2008, was the year of price declines; 2009 and 2010 will be the years of bankruptcies and restructurings. Loans will be written down and assets will be sold. It will be a very difficult time. It is going to surprise a lot of people because many people figure it is bad but still expect, as in all past post-World War II periods, we will come out of it OK. A lot of difficult questions will be asked of policy makers. The government decision-making mechanism is going to be tested, because different people will have different points of view about what should be done.
What are you suggesting?
An example is the Federal Reserve, which has always been an autonomous institution with the freedom to act as it sees fit. Rep. Barney Frank [a Massachusetts Democrat and chairman of the House Financial Services Committee] is talking about examining the authority of the Federal Reserve, and that raises the specter of the government and Congress trying to run the Federal Reserve. Everybody will be second-guessing everybody else.
So where do things stand in the process of restructuring?
What the Federal Reserve has done and what the Treasury has done, by and large, is to take an existing debt and say they will own it or lend against it. But they haven't said they are going to write down the debt and cut debt payments each month. There has been little in the way of debt relief yet. Very, very few actual mortgages have been restructured. Very little corporate debt has been restructured.
The Federal Reserve, in particular, has done a number of successful things. The Federal Reserve went out and bought or lent against a lot of the debt. That has had the effect of reducing the risk of that debt defaulting, so that is good in a sense. And because the risk of default has gone down, it has forced the interest rate on the debt to go down, and that is good, too.
However, the reason it hasn't actually produced increased credit activity is because the debtors are still too indebted and not able to properly service the debt. Only when those debts are actually written down will we get to the point where we will have credit growth. There is a mortgage debt piece that will need to be restructured. There is a giant financial-sector piece -- banks and investment banks and whatever is left of the financial sector -- that will need to be restructured. There is a corporate piece that will need to be restructured, and then there is a commercial-real-estate piece that will need to be restructured.
Is a restructuring of the banks a starting point?
If you think that restructuring the banks is going to get lending going again and you don't restructure the other pieces -- the mortgage piece, the corporate piece, the real-estate piece -- you are wrong, because they need financially sound entities to lend to, and that won't happen until there are restructurings.
On the issue of the banks, ultimately we need banks because to produce credit we have to have banks. A lot of the banks aren't going to have money, and yet we can't just let them go to nothing; we have got to do something.
But the future of banking is going to be very, very different. The regulators have to decide how banks will operate. That means they will have to nationalize some in some form, but they are going to also have to decide who they protect: the bondholders or the depositors?
Nationalization is the most likely outcome?
There will be substantial nationalization of banks. It is going on now and it will continue. But the same question will be asked even after nationalization: What will happen to the pile of bad stuff?
Let's say we are going to end up with the good-bank/bad-bank concept. The government is going to put a lot of money in -- say $100 billion -- and going to get all the garbage at a leverage of, let's say, 10 to 1. They will have a trillion dollars, but a trillion dollars' worth of garbage. They still aren't marking it down. Does this give you comfort?
Then we have the remaining banks, many of which will be broke. The government will have to recapitalize them. The government will try to seek private money to go in with them, but I don't think they are going to come up with a lot of private money, not nearly the amount needed.
To the extent we are going to have nationalized banks, we will still have the question of how those banks behave. Does Congress say what they should do? Does Congress demand they lend to bad borrowers? There is a reason they aren't lending. So whose money is it, and who is protecting that money?
The biggest issue is that if you look at the borrowers, you don't want to lend to them. The basic problem is that the borrowers had too much debt when their incomes were higher and their asset values were higher. Now net worths have gone down.
Let me give you an example. Roughly speaking, most of commercial real estate and a good deal of private equity was bought on leverage of 3-to-1. Most of it is down by more than one-third, so therefore they have negative net worth. Most of them couldn't service their debt when the cash flows were up, and now the cash flows are a lot lower. If you shouldn't have lent to them before, how can you possibly lend to them now?
I guess I'm thinking of the examples of people and businesses with solid credit records who can't get banks to lend to them.
Those examples exist, but they aren't, by and large, the big picture. There are too many nonviable entities. Big pieces of the economy have to become somehow more viable. This isn't primarily about a lack of liquidity. There are certainly elements of that, but this is basically a structural issue. The '30s were very similar to this.
By the way, in the bear market from 1929 to the bottom, stocks declined 89%, with six rallies of returns of more than 20% -- and most of them produced renewed optimism. But what happened was that the economy continued to weaken with the debt problem. The Hoover administration had the equivalent of today's TARP [Troubled Asset Relief Program] in the Reconstruction Finance Corp. The stimulus program and tax cuts created more spending, and the budget deficit increased.
At the same time, countries around the world encountered a similar kind of thing. England went through then exactly what it is going through now. Just as now, countries couldn't get dollars because of the slowdown in exports, and there was a dollar shortage, as there is now. Efforts were directed at rekindling lending. But they did not rekindle lending. Eventually there were a lot of bankruptcies, which extinguished debt.
In the U.S., a Democratic administration replaced a Republican one and there was a major devaluation and reflation that marked the bottom of the Depression in March 1933.
Where is the U.S. and the rest of the world going to keep getting money to pay for these stimulus packages?
The Federal Reserve is going to have to print money. The deficits will be greater than the savings. So you will see the Federal Reserve buy long-term Treasury bonds, as it did in the Great Depression. We are in a position where that will eventually create a problem for currencies and drive assets to gold.
Are you a fan of gold?
Yes.
Have you always been?
No. Gold is horrible sometimes and great other times. But like any other asset class, everybody always should have a piece of it in their portfolio.
What about bonds? The conventional wisdom has it that bonds are the most overbought and most dangerous asset class right now.
Everything is timing. You print a lot of money, and then you have currency devaluation. The currency devaluation happens before bonds fall. Not much in the way of inflation is produced, because what you are doing actually is negating deflation. So, the first wave of currency depreciation will be very much like England in 1992, with its currency realignment, or the United States during the Great Depression, when they printed money and devalued the dollar a lot. Gold went up a whole lot and the bond market had a hiccup, and then long-term rates continued to decline because people still needed safety and liquidity. While the dollar is bad, it doesn't mean necessarily that the bond market is bad.
I can easily imagine at some point I'm going to hate bonds and want to be short bonds, but, for now, a portfolio that is a mixture of Treasury bonds and gold is going to be a very good portfolio, because I imagine gold could go up a whole lot and Treasury bonds won't go down a whole lot, at first.
Ideally, creditor countries that don't have dollar-debt problems are the place you want to be, like Japan. The Japanese economy will do horribly, too, but they don't have the problems that we have -- and they have surpluses. They can pull in their assets from abroad, which will support their currency, because they will want to become defensive. Other currencies will decline in relationship to the yen and in relationship to gold.
And China?
Now we have the delicate China question. That is a complicated, touchy question.
The reasons for China to hold dollar-denominated assets no longer exist, for the most part. However, the desire to have a weaker currency is everybody's desire in terms of stimulus. China recognizes that the exchange-rate peg is not as important as it was before, because the idea was to make its goods competitive in the world. Ultimately, they are going to have to go to a domestic-based economy. But they own too much in the way of dollar-denominated assets to get out, and it isn't clear exactly where they would go if they did get out. But they don't have to buy more. They are not going to continue to want to double down.
From the U.S. point of view, we want a devaluation. A devaluation gets your pricing in line. When there is a deflationary environment, you want your currency to go down. When you have a lot of foreign debt denominated in your currency, you want to create relief by having your currency go down. All major currency devaluations have triggered stock-market rallies throughout the world; one of the best ways to trigger a stock-market rally is to devalue your currency.
But there is a basic structural problem with China. Its per capita income is less than 10% of ours. We have to get our prices in line, and we are not going to do it by cutting our incomes to a level of Chinese incomes.
And they are not going to do it by having their per capita incomes coming in line with our per capita incomes. But they have to come closer together. The Chinese currency and assets are too cheap in dollar terms, so a devaluation of the dollar in relation to China's currency is likely, and will be an important step to our reflation and will make investments in China attractive.
You mentioned, too, that inflation is not as big a worry for you as it is for some. Could you elaborate?
A wave of currency devaluations and strong gold will serve to negate deflationary pressures, bringing inflation to a low, positive number rather than producing unacceptably high inflation -- and that will last for as far as I can see out, roughly about two years.
Given this outlook, what is your view on stocks?
Buying equities and taking on those risks in late 2009, or more likely 2010, will be a great move because equities will be much cheaper than now. It is going to be a buying opportunity of the century.
Thanks, Ray.
Matthew Furman for Barron's
"The regulators have to decide how banks will operate. That means they are going to have to nationalize some in some form." -- Ray Dalio
No wonder. The Westport, Conn.-based firm, whose analyses of world markets focus on credit and currencies, has produced long-term annual returns, net of fees, averaging 15%. In the turmoil of 2008, Bridgewater's Pure Alpha 1 fund gained 8.7% net of fees and Pure Alpha 2 delivered 9.4%.
Here's what's on his mind now.
Barron's: I can't think of anyone who was earlier in describing the deleveraging and deflationary process that has been happening around the world.
Dalio: Let's call it a "D-process," which is different than a recession, and the only reason that people really don't understand this process is because it happens rarely. Everybody should, at this point, try to understand the depression process by reading about the Great Depression or the Latin American debt crisis or the Japanese experience so that it becomes part of their frame of reference. Most people didn't live through any of those experiences, and what they have gotten used to is the recession dynamic, and so they are quick to presume the recession dynamic. It is very clear to me that we are in a D-process.
Why are you hesitant to emphasize either the words depression or deflation? Why call it a D-process?
Both of those words have connotations associated with them that can confuse the fact that it is a process that people should try to understand.
You can describe a recession as an economic retraction which occurs when the Federal Reserve tightens monetary policy normally to fight inflation. The cycle continues until the economy weakens enough to bring down the inflation rate, at which time the Federal Reserve eases monetary policy and produces an expansion. We can make it more complicated, but that is a basic simple description of what recessions are and what we have experienced through the post-World War II period. What you also need is a comparable understanding of what a D-process is and why it is different.
You have made the point that only by understanding the process can you combat the problem. Are you confident that we are doing what's essential to combat deflation and a depression?
The D-process is a disease of sorts that is going to run its course.
When I first started seeing the D-process and describing it, it was before it actually started to play out this way. But now you can ask yourself, OK, when was the last time bank stocks went down so much? When was the last time the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve, or any central bank, exploded like it has? When was the last time interest rates went to zero, essentially, making monetary policy as we know it ineffective? When was the last time we had deflation?
The answers to those questions all point to times other than the U.S. post-World War II experience. This was the dynamic that occurred in Japan in the '90s, that occurred in Latin America in the '80s, and that occurred in the Great Depression in the '30s.
Basically what happens is that after a period of time, economies go through a long-term debt cycle -- a dynamic that is self-reinforcing, in which people finance their spending by borrowing and debts rise relative to incomes and, more accurately, debt-service payments rise relative to incomes. At cycle peaks, assets are bought on leverage at high-enough prices that the cash flows they produce aren't adequate to service the debt. The incomes aren't adequate to service the debt. Then begins the reversal process, and that becomes self-reinforcing, too. In the simplest sense, the country reaches the point when it needs a debt restructuring. General Motors is a metaphor for the United States.
As goes GM, so goes the nation?
The process of bankruptcy or restructuring is necessary to its viability. One way or another, General Motors has to be restructured so that it is a self-sustaining, economically viable entity that people want to lend to again.
This has happened in Latin America regularly. Emerging countries default, and then restructure. It is an essential process to get them economically healthy.
We will go through a giant debt-restructuring, because we either have to bring debt-service payments down so they are low relative to incomes -- the cash flows that are being produced to service them -- or we are going to have to raise incomes by printing a lot of money.
It isn't complicated. It is the same as all bankruptcies, but when it happens pervasively to a country, and the country has a lot of foreign debt denominated in its own currency, it is preferable to print money and devalue.
Isn't the process of restructuring under way in households and at corporations?
They are cutting costs to service the debt. But they haven't yet done much restructuring. Last year, 2008, was the year of price declines; 2009 and 2010 will be the years of bankruptcies and restructurings. Loans will be written down and assets will be sold. It will be a very difficult time. It is going to surprise a lot of people because many people figure it is bad but still expect, as in all past post-World War II periods, we will come out of it OK. A lot of difficult questions will be asked of policy makers. The government decision-making mechanism is going to be tested, because different people will have different points of view about what should be done.
What are you suggesting?
An example is the Federal Reserve, which has always been an autonomous institution with the freedom to act as it sees fit. Rep. Barney Frank [a Massachusetts Democrat and chairman of the House Financial Services Committee] is talking about examining the authority of the Federal Reserve, and that raises the specter of the government and Congress trying to run the Federal Reserve. Everybody will be second-guessing everybody else.
So where do things stand in the process of restructuring?
What the Federal Reserve has done and what the Treasury has done, by and large, is to take an existing debt and say they will own it or lend against it. But they haven't said they are going to write down the debt and cut debt payments each month. There has been little in the way of debt relief yet. Very, very few actual mortgages have been restructured. Very little corporate debt has been restructured.
The Federal Reserve, in particular, has done a number of successful things. The Federal Reserve went out and bought or lent against a lot of the debt. That has had the effect of reducing the risk of that debt defaulting, so that is good in a sense. And because the risk of default has gone down, it has forced the interest rate on the debt to go down, and that is good, too.
However, the reason it hasn't actually produced increased credit activity is because the debtors are still too indebted and not able to properly service the debt. Only when those debts are actually written down will we get to the point where we will have credit growth. There is a mortgage debt piece that will need to be restructured. There is a giant financial-sector piece -- banks and investment banks and whatever is left of the financial sector -- that will need to be restructured. There is a corporate piece that will need to be restructured, and then there is a commercial-real-estate piece that will need to be restructured.
Is a restructuring of the banks a starting point?
If you think that restructuring the banks is going to get lending going again and you don't restructure the other pieces -- the mortgage piece, the corporate piece, the real-estate piece -- you are wrong, because they need financially sound entities to lend to, and that won't happen until there are restructurings.
On the issue of the banks, ultimately we need banks because to produce credit we have to have banks. A lot of the banks aren't going to have money, and yet we can't just let them go to nothing; we have got to do something.
But the future of banking is going to be very, very different. The regulators have to decide how banks will operate. That means they will have to nationalize some in some form, but they are going to also have to decide who they protect: the bondholders or the depositors?
Nationalization is the most likely outcome?
There will be substantial nationalization of banks. It is going on now and it will continue. But the same question will be asked even after nationalization: What will happen to the pile of bad stuff?
Let's say we are going to end up with the good-bank/bad-bank concept. The government is going to put a lot of money in -- say $100 billion -- and going to get all the garbage at a leverage of, let's say, 10 to 1. They will have a trillion dollars, but a trillion dollars' worth of garbage. They still aren't marking it down. Does this give you comfort?
Then we have the remaining banks, many of which will be broke. The government will have to recapitalize them. The government will try to seek private money to go in with them, but I don't think they are going to come up with a lot of private money, not nearly the amount needed.
To the extent we are going to have nationalized banks, we will still have the question of how those banks behave. Does Congress say what they should do? Does Congress demand they lend to bad borrowers? There is a reason they aren't lending. So whose money is it, and who is protecting that money?
The biggest issue is that if you look at the borrowers, you don't want to lend to them. The basic problem is that the borrowers had too much debt when their incomes were higher and their asset values were higher. Now net worths have gone down.
Let me give you an example. Roughly speaking, most of commercial real estate and a good deal of private equity was bought on leverage of 3-to-1. Most of it is down by more than one-third, so therefore they have negative net worth. Most of them couldn't service their debt when the cash flows were up, and now the cash flows are a lot lower. If you shouldn't have lent to them before, how can you possibly lend to them now?
I guess I'm thinking of the examples of people and businesses with solid credit records who can't get banks to lend to them.
Those examples exist, but they aren't, by and large, the big picture. There are too many nonviable entities. Big pieces of the economy have to become somehow more viable. This isn't primarily about a lack of liquidity. There are certainly elements of that, but this is basically a structural issue. The '30s were very similar to this.
By the way, in the bear market from 1929 to the bottom, stocks declined 89%, with six rallies of returns of more than 20% -- and most of them produced renewed optimism. But what happened was that the economy continued to weaken with the debt problem. The Hoover administration had the equivalent of today's TARP [Troubled Asset Relief Program] in the Reconstruction Finance Corp. The stimulus program and tax cuts created more spending, and the budget deficit increased.
At the same time, countries around the world encountered a similar kind of thing. England went through then exactly what it is going through now. Just as now, countries couldn't get dollars because of the slowdown in exports, and there was a dollar shortage, as there is now. Efforts were directed at rekindling lending. But they did not rekindle lending. Eventually there were a lot of bankruptcies, which extinguished debt.
In the U.S., a Democratic administration replaced a Republican one and there was a major devaluation and reflation that marked the bottom of the Depression in March 1933.
Where is the U.S. and the rest of the world going to keep getting money to pay for these stimulus packages?
The Federal Reserve is going to have to print money. The deficits will be greater than the savings. So you will see the Federal Reserve buy long-term Treasury bonds, as it did in the Great Depression. We are in a position where that will eventually create a problem for currencies and drive assets to gold.
Are you a fan of gold?
Yes.
Have you always been?
No. Gold is horrible sometimes and great other times. But like any other asset class, everybody always should have a piece of it in their portfolio.
What about bonds? The conventional wisdom has it that bonds are the most overbought and most dangerous asset class right now.
Everything is timing. You print a lot of money, and then you have currency devaluation. The currency devaluation happens before bonds fall. Not much in the way of inflation is produced, because what you are doing actually is negating deflation. So, the first wave of currency depreciation will be very much like England in 1992, with its currency realignment, or the United States during the Great Depression, when they printed money and devalued the dollar a lot. Gold went up a whole lot and the bond market had a hiccup, and then long-term rates continued to decline because people still needed safety and liquidity. While the dollar is bad, it doesn't mean necessarily that the bond market is bad.
I can easily imagine at some point I'm going to hate bonds and want to be short bonds, but, for now, a portfolio that is a mixture of Treasury bonds and gold is going to be a very good portfolio, because I imagine gold could go up a whole lot and Treasury bonds won't go down a whole lot, at first.
Ideally, creditor countries that don't have dollar-debt problems are the place you want to be, like Japan. The Japanese economy will do horribly, too, but they don't have the problems that we have -- and they have surpluses. They can pull in their assets from abroad, which will support their currency, because they will want to become defensive. Other currencies will decline in relationship to the yen and in relationship to gold.
And China?
Now we have the delicate China question. That is a complicated, touchy question.
The reasons for China to hold dollar-denominated assets no longer exist, for the most part. However, the desire to have a weaker currency is everybody's desire in terms of stimulus. China recognizes that the exchange-rate peg is not as important as it was before, because the idea was to make its goods competitive in the world. Ultimately, they are going to have to go to a domestic-based economy. But they own too much in the way of dollar-denominated assets to get out, and it isn't clear exactly where they would go if they did get out. But they don't have to buy more. They are not going to continue to want to double down.
From the U.S. point of view, we want a devaluation. A devaluation gets your pricing in line. When there is a deflationary environment, you want your currency to go down. When you have a lot of foreign debt denominated in your currency, you want to create relief by having your currency go down. All major currency devaluations have triggered stock-market rallies throughout the world; one of the best ways to trigger a stock-market rally is to devalue your currency.
But there is a basic structural problem with China. Its per capita income is less than 10% of ours. We have to get our prices in line, and we are not going to do it by cutting our incomes to a level of Chinese incomes.
And they are not going to do it by having their per capita incomes coming in line with our per capita incomes. But they have to come closer together. The Chinese currency and assets are too cheap in dollar terms, so a devaluation of the dollar in relation to China's currency is likely, and will be an important step to our reflation and will make investments in China attractive.
You mentioned, too, that inflation is not as big a worry for you as it is for some. Could you elaborate?
A wave of currency devaluations and strong gold will serve to negate deflationary pressures, bringing inflation to a low, positive number rather than producing unacceptably high inflation -- and that will last for as far as I can see out, roughly about two years.
Given this outlook, what is your view on stocks?
Buying equities and taking on those risks in late 2009, or more likely 2010, will be a great move because equities will be much cheaper than now. It is going to be a buying opportunity of the century.
Thanks, Ray.
Friday, February 6, 2009
Unemployment Comparison 74 vs. 08
1974 (Half of the work force)
November - 368K
December - 602K
January -360k
February -378k
March -270k
April -186k
May +160k
June -104k
2008
November - 533K
December - 589K
Stay tuned.
November - 368K
December - 602K
January -360k
February -378k
March -270k
April -186k
May +160k
June -104k
2008
November - 533K
December - 589K
Stay tuned.
Wednesday, February 4, 2009
Monday, February 2, 2009
Now Hiring, Lehman
It's bankrupt. Its reputation is in tatters. And it has been forced from its plush headquarters building. Yet working for Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. -- what remains of it -- has become one of the hottest jobs on Wall Street.
That's because Lehman, though a shadow of its former self after selling many of its businesses to Barclays PLC and Nomura Holdings Inc., retains a broad patchwork of assets. It has some $7 billion in cash and more than 1,400 private investments valued at $12.3 billion. Then there's a thicket of about 500,000 derivative contracts with 4,000 trading partners worth some $24 billion.
Then & Now
Associated PressThen:
CEO: Richard Fuld (above)
Employees: 25,158
Cash on balance sheet: $3.3 billion
Alvarez & MarsalNow:
CEO: Bryan Marsal, (above)
Employees: 500
Cash on balance sheet: $7 billion
So for now, Lehman is seen as a relatively secure home for throngs of finance professionals thrown out of work in recent months. It's even become a place for former Lehman CEO Richard Fuld to informally hang his hat.
"We're getting swamped with résumés," says Bryan Marsal, a turnaround expert who is now Lehman's chief executive officer. The inquiries, he says, are from people affiliated with marquee names such as Bank of America, Citigroup Inc., and Morgan Stanley.
"It's just a tough, tough time, and there are a lot of good people out there looking for work."
The wages are not great by past standards. But there are hidden benefits. It could take two years or more to wind down the firm. Such a timeline promises the kind of job security that's a rarity on Wall Street today.
Charged with untangling the mess is Alvarez & Marsal, the New York-based restructuring firm where Mr. Marsal is a co-founder. With 150 full-time employees working on the case, its chief task is to sell off Lehman's remaining assets and maximize recovery for creditors, which are owed more than $150 billion.
Mr. Marsal says the goal is to dissolve the firm in 18 to 24 months from now, though several restructuring experts say that's an aggressive timetable.
Alvarez & Marsal got the gig in September after Lehman's board appointed it to administer the bankrupt company's estate. To carry out the mission, Alvarez & Marsal kept 130 Lehman employees on the firm's payroll. It has also recruited back more than 200 former Lehman employees, and is still hiring staff to handle targeted areas such derivatives and real-estate holdings.
Behind the scenes is Mr. Fuld, the firm's former chairman and chief executive, who was widely vilified when Lehman collapsed in mid-September. Though Mr. Fuld was removed from the payroll on Jan. 1 and relieved of his company-provided black Mercedes, Lehman has agreed to let him keep an office at the firm. He's just around the corner from Mr. Marsal, who says he picks Mr. Fuld's brain about Lehman's business several times a week.
"We asked him to stay if he has nowhere better to go," says Mr. Marsal. "He's been very good about making himself available for questions about Lehman assets."
Through a spokeswoman, Mr. Fuld declined to comment.
Lehman's dismantling is an expensive process. Associated costs run about $30 million a month, excluding fees to lawyers and advisers on the case. Employees are paid a salary -- with modest retention bonus added as "a kiss" says Mr. Marsal -- to entice workers to stay at a place with a limited lifespan.
Life Inside Lehman Brothers
3:25
WSJ's Dennis Berman and Peter Lattman discuss the latest at Lehman Brothers, where job stability has become surprisingly ubiquitous.
The assignment is a lucrative one for Alvarez & Marsal, which is charging Lehman hourly fees of $550 to $850 for its top executives working on the case, with rich incentive fees for the firm depending on its recovery for creditors.
Despite Lehman's assured dissolution, executive recruiters say it isn't surprising that the collapsed investment bank has become a desirable place to work.
"This is a well-paying job in one of the worst employment markets in history," says Skiddy von Stade, founder of New York-based executive placement firm F.S. von Stade & Associates. "Through the disposition of Lehman's assets, the employees will have a chance to demonstrate their strengths and skills for opportunities down the road -- possibly with the very buyers of these securities and investments."
Mr. Marsal says compensation is in line with similar jobs on Wall Street, yet far below what it was at Lehman. He and his team are "very, very careful" about the expenses of the firm, which he says are generally lean. "The excess of Lehman was the size of the salaries and the expectations of people with the bonus plan," he says.
View Full Image
Reuters
Staff members stand in a meeting room at the Lehman Brothers offices in the financial district of Canary Wharf in London Sept. 11, 2008.
Gone are the pay and perks that came with being a top executive at pre-bankruptcy Lehman. Mr. Fuld and his management team sat on the 31st floor of Lehman's former headquarters, a state-of-the-art steel-and-granite building in Times Square. Barclays bought that site and took it over, so now Lehman's command center is a run-of-the-mill office on the 45th floor of the Time-Life building, which long served as Lehman overflow space.
Mr. Marsal and his team are making due without weekly deliveries of fresh flowers and warm chocolate-chip muffins on Fridays -- perks enjoyed by the firm's former brass. Gone too is the executive dining suite where a private chef prepared lunch for Lehman's top executives. Instead, Mr. Marsal and his crew grab a bite in the cafeteria at Time Inc., which has granted access to the Lehman employees.
Henry Klein is part of Lehman's new topsy-turvy reality. A nine-year Lehman veteran, he oversaw a portfolio of investments in India from the firm's New York office. When Lehman failed, Mr. Klein was transferred to Barclays, but says he had little to do there. "I was at Barclays, but my assets were at Lehman."
Mr. Klein left Barclays in mid-November, and then approached Alvarez & Marsal. Today, he's back overseeing the very assets he says he managed at Lehman.
The 46-year-old Mr. Klein is currently focused on a small $36 million real-estate investment in Hyderabad, a large city in south central India. Lehman may continue to back the deal, but also may have to pull its funding. "It's a difficult decision," says Mr. Klein. "We don't have tons of time."
Luc Faucheux, 39, heads up the desk at the bankrupt entity that trades interest-rate swaps and other fixed-income derivatives. "I always wanted this job," laughs the former Lehman staffer who says he had a related, but less senior role. "Be careful what you wish for, because you might just get it."
"Let's face it," he adds. "Given the state of the world we're in, the things I'm learning working on the largest bankruptcy in history are a set of skills that could be marketable for the foreseeable future."
Rather than immediately sell assets into a depressed market, Alvarez & Marsal has opted to retain and manage a chunk of Lehman's holdings.
Last month, Alvarez & Marsal decided to keep a 49% interest in Lehman's money-management business, Neuberger Investment Management, selling the balance to Neuberger's management. It made a similar move with Lehman Brothers Merchant Banking, the firm's flagship private-equity business. The estate also has held on to more than 100 direct stakes in private companies. These include direct investments made alongside Lehman's private-equity clients in large boom-era buyouts such as First Data Corp. and Texas utility TXU Corp.
So far, Lehman has more than doubled its cash reserves to $7 billion from $3.3 billion, in part through the sale of its headquarters to Barclays. It is also raising money by selling off the firm's sizable art collection, whose value Lehman has pegged at roughly $30 million. Some of the photographs and paintings still grace the halls of Barclays and Lehman's Neuberger unit.
Finally, there is a cavalry of corporate jets valued at $164 million. Lehman has already sold six jets, as well as interests in fractional shares service NetJets Inc. for $53 million. Still on the block: Six more planes, including a Boeing 767, and a Sikorsky chopper.
Some of those jets Lehman owned as investments and only four were used for corporate purposes at any one time, according to a Lehman spokeswoman.
"The fleet's been grounded," Mr. Marsal reassured the bankruptcy judge overseeing the case at a hearing last month. "Nobody is flying around these planes and no one is using the helicopter.
That's because Lehman, though a shadow of its former self after selling many of its businesses to Barclays PLC and Nomura Holdings Inc., retains a broad patchwork of assets. It has some $7 billion in cash and more than 1,400 private investments valued at $12.3 billion. Then there's a thicket of about 500,000 derivative contracts with 4,000 trading partners worth some $24 billion.
Then & Now
Associated PressThen:
CEO: Richard Fuld (above)
Employees: 25,158
Cash on balance sheet: $3.3 billion
Alvarez & MarsalNow:
CEO: Bryan Marsal, (above)
Employees: 500
Cash on balance sheet: $7 billion
So for now, Lehman is seen as a relatively secure home for throngs of finance professionals thrown out of work in recent months. It's even become a place for former Lehman CEO Richard Fuld to informally hang his hat.
"We're getting swamped with résumés," says Bryan Marsal, a turnaround expert who is now Lehman's chief executive officer. The inquiries, he says, are from people affiliated with marquee names such as Bank of America, Citigroup Inc., and Morgan Stanley.
"It's just a tough, tough time, and there are a lot of good people out there looking for work."
The wages are not great by past standards. But there are hidden benefits. It could take two years or more to wind down the firm. Such a timeline promises the kind of job security that's a rarity on Wall Street today.
Charged with untangling the mess is Alvarez & Marsal, the New York-based restructuring firm where Mr. Marsal is a co-founder. With 150 full-time employees working on the case, its chief task is to sell off Lehman's remaining assets and maximize recovery for creditors, which are owed more than $150 billion.
Mr. Marsal says the goal is to dissolve the firm in 18 to 24 months from now, though several restructuring experts say that's an aggressive timetable.
Alvarez & Marsal got the gig in September after Lehman's board appointed it to administer the bankrupt company's estate. To carry out the mission, Alvarez & Marsal kept 130 Lehman employees on the firm's payroll. It has also recruited back more than 200 former Lehman employees, and is still hiring staff to handle targeted areas such derivatives and real-estate holdings.
Behind the scenes is Mr. Fuld, the firm's former chairman and chief executive, who was widely vilified when Lehman collapsed in mid-September. Though Mr. Fuld was removed from the payroll on Jan. 1 and relieved of his company-provided black Mercedes, Lehman has agreed to let him keep an office at the firm. He's just around the corner from Mr. Marsal, who says he picks Mr. Fuld's brain about Lehman's business several times a week.
"We asked him to stay if he has nowhere better to go," says Mr. Marsal. "He's been very good about making himself available for questions about Lehman assets."
Through a spokeswoman, Mr. Fuld declined to comment.
Lehman's dismantling is an expensive process. Associated costs run about $30 million a month, excluding fees to lawyers and advisers on the case. Employees are paid a salary -- with modest retention bonus added as "a kiss" says Mr. Marsal -- to entice workers to stay at a place with a limited lifespan.
Life Inside Lehman Brothers
3:25
WSJ's Dennis Berman and Peter Lattman discuss the latest at Lehman Brothers, where job stability has become surprisingly ubiquitous.
The assignment is a lucrative one for Alvarez & Marsal, which is charging Lehman hourly fees of $550 to $850 for its top executives working on the case, with rich incentive fees for the firm depending on its recovery for creditors.
Despite Lehman's assured dissolution, executive recruiters say it isn't surprising that the collapsed investment bank has become a desirable place to work.
"This is a well-paying job in one of the worst employment markets in history," says Skiddy von Stade, founder of New York-based executive placement firm F.S. von Stade & Associates. "Through the disposition of Lehman's assets, the employees will have a chance to demonstrate their strengths and skills for opportunities down the road -- possibly with the very buyers of these securities and investments."
Mr. Marsal says compensation is in line with similar jobs on Wall Street, yet far below what it was at Lehman. He and his team are "very, very careful" about the expenses of the firm, which he says are generally lean. "The excess of Lehman was the size of the salaries and the expectations of people with the bonus plan," he says.
View Full Image
Reuters
Staff members stand in a meeting room at the Lehman Brothers offices in the financial district of Canary Wharf in London Sept. 11, 2008.
Gone are the pay and perks that came with being a top executive at pre-bankruptcy Lehman. Mr. Fuld and his management team sat on the 31st floor of Lehman's former headquarters, a state-of-the-art steel-and-granite building in Times Square. Barclays bought that site and took it over, so now Lehman's command center is a run-of-the-mill office on the 45th floor of the Time-Life building, which long served as Lehman overflow space.
Mr. Marsal and his team are making due without weekly deliveries of fresh flowers and warm chocolate-chip muffins on Fridays -- perks enjoyed by the firm's former brass. Gone too is the executive dining suite where a private chef prepared lunch for Lehman's top executives. Instead, Mr. Marsal and his crew grab a bite in the cafeteria at Time Inc., which has granted access to the Lehman employees.
Henry Klein is part of Lehman's new topsy-turvy reality. A nine-year Lehman veteran, he oversaw a portfolio of investments in India from the firm's New York office. When Lehman failed, Mr. Klein was transferred to Barclays, but says he had little to do there. "I was at Barclays, but my assets were at Lehman."
Mr. Klein left Barclays in mid-November, and then approached Alvarez & Marsal. Today, he's back overseeing the very assets he says he managed at Lehman.
The 46-year-old Mr. Klein is currently focused on a small $36 million real-estate investment in Hyderabad, a large city in south central India. Lehman may continue to back the deal, but also may have to pull its funding. "It's a difficult decision," says Mr. Klein. "We don't have tons of time."
Luc Faucheux, 39, heads up the desk at the bankrupt entity that trades interest-rate swaps and other fixed-income derivatives. "I always wanted this job," laughs the former Lehman staffer who says he had a related, but less senior role. "Be careful what you wish for, because you might just get it."
"Let's face it," he adds. "Given the state of the world we're in, the things I'm learning working on the largest bankruptcy in history are a set of skills that could be marketable for the foreseeable future."
Rather than immediately sell assets into a depressed market, Alvarez & Marsal has opted to retain and manage a chunk of Lehman's holdings.
Last month, Alvarez & Marsal decided to keep a 49% interest in Lehman's money-management business, Neuberger Investment Management, selling the balance to Neuberger's management. It made a similar move with Lehman Brothers Merchant Banking, the firm's flagship private-equity business. The estate also has held on to more than 100 direct stakes in private companies. These include direct investments made alongside Lehman's private-equity clients in large boom-era buyouts such as First Data Corp. and Texas utility TXU Corp.
So far, Lehman has more than doubled its cash reserves to $7 billion from $3.3 billion, in part through the sale of its headquarters to Barclays. It is also raising money by selling off the firm's sizable art collection, whose value Lehman has pegged at roughly $30 million. Some of the photographs and paintings still grace the halls of Barclays and Lehman's Neuberger unit.
Finally, there is a cavalry of corporate jets valued at $164 million. Lehman has already sold six jets, as well as interests in fractional shares service NetJets Inc. for $53 million. Still on the block: Six more planes, including a Boeing 767, and a Sikorsky chopper.
Some of those jets Lehman owned as investments and only four were used for corporate purposes at any one time, according to a Lehman spokeswoman.
"The fleet's been grounded," Mr. Marsal reassured the bankruptcy judge overseeing the case at a hearing last month. "Nobody is flying around these planes and no one is using the helicopter.
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